


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29 March 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ONE Meeting between ONE Board and Chester Cooper

1. Yesterday afternoon I attended a meeting of the Board of Estimates at which Chester Cooper, upon the direction of Ambassador Harriman, spoke on the subject of Soviet and Chinese reactions to an escalation of the war. In addition, Mr. Cooper spoke specifically to the ONE memorandum of 6 February 1967 which was the ONE assessment of Soviet and Chinese reactions to the programs analyzed in McNamara IV. Ambassador Harriman had some problems with the ONE paper and the copy of his letter to the DCI expressing these reservations is attached.

2. Cooper said that the next 60 to 90 days will see continued escalation of the war in both the south and the north and that he and his principals are especially concerned over the effects of escalating the air war. He said the air war would escalate both in terms of the scale of bombings and the targets attacked. With the exception of inhabited areas per se, the zones bordering Communist China, the dikes, the mining of Haiphong, and the airfields, almost everything else in the country was eligible for attack. He also said that during this period the channels available for probing the possibility of negotiations would not be open. With this in mind, Cooper felt the ONE paper was too generalized and bland, that it did not present enough numbers and did not provide a systematic analysis of the alternative courses of action available to the Soviets and the Chinese. On this last point, Cooper said that the Agency should consider such things as the types of weapons systems or the extent of manpower that the Soviets or Chinese might send into North Vietnam, or other courses of action that the USSR could adopt elsewhere in the world. He also stated the problem as being one of determining the level of tolerance which would have to be surpassed before the Soviets or the Chinese became more deeply involved in the war.

3. In the discussion that followed it became clear that Cooper and supposedly Harriman did not know of the existence of McNamara IV and that the ONE paper was addressed specifically to the programs analyzed in McNamara IV. In view of Ambassador Harriman's concern about the effects of the escalation, I would recommend that he be provided a copy of McNamara IV.

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4. The meeting resulted in ONE agreeing to prepare a new report on the effects of escalation. This report would do two essential things: (1) Restate the general policy orientation of the USSR, Communist China, and North Vietnam in regard to the war and catalog the options available to them in reacting to escalations; and (2) Analyze the effects of the attack program hinted at by Mr. Cooper, with and without a mining program. The due date for this project was set tentatively as 10 April. [REDACTED] is the action officer for the ONE staff. I will meet with him today to discuss the ORR contribution but essentially it will be to spell out the target system to be analyzed and to measure the effects of the attack, particularly those effects which are most likely to result in an extension of either the Soviet or Chinese commitment in the war.

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[REDACTED]

Chief, Trade and Services Division

Attachment: a/s

Distribution:

Original - DDI
1 - D/ORR
1 - Ch/E
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ORR/D/T: [REDACTED]; ldr/5201 (29 Mar 67)

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